Turkey’s War on the Kurds and ISIS - Part Two

By Thomas Phillips - 1/8/2015

Introduction

In August 2005, Racep Tayyip Erdogan visited Diyarbakir and proclaimed, “The Kurdish problem is my problem. [It] will be solved with the deepening of democracy… Turkey will not step back from our process of democratization” [i]. Similarly, the authoritative leader of the Kurdish PKK has seemingly abandoned the decades old struggle for an independent Kurdish state. According to Öcalan, “It is not the changing of political boundaries that matters here but the transformation of their content”[ii].

This switch in focus – from an armed struggle for independence to a democratic struggle for more freedom within Turkey’s borders – provided the basis for a peace process of sorts. A ceasefire has been in place since March 2013 and the PKK has largely withdrawn to the Qandil Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan. Its affiliate in northern Syria, the PYD, has made every effort to develop friendly relations with Turkey – even going so far as to assist Turkish troops in their operation to evacuate the tomb of Suleyman Sah from northern Syria[iii].

This is the second part of a three part series examining the months leading up to the Turkish attacks on PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The article will focus on recent moves in the drive for a lasting peace with the PKK and critique the argument – advanced by the AKP, the US State Department, the UK and NATO – that a new war on the Kurds is a necessary defensive move.

The Kobane Attack

Part one explained that ISIS fighters attacked the autonomous Kurdish canton of Kobane in September 2014. According to an unnamed US administration official “After all the fulminating about a humanitarian catastrophe, [Turkey is] inventing reasons not to act to prevent another catastrophe… This isn’t how a NATO ally acts while hell is unfolding a stone’s throw from their border”[iv]. According to a report in the Guardian “As Turkish troops and tanks stand guard at the border, many Kurds are desperate and angry, assaulted by Turkish teargas, water cannon and police violence”[v].

In an exclusive interview with al-Monitor, the PKK’s top commander, Cemil Bayik, responded to Turkey’s passive support for the ISIS onslaught: “The attacks by Deash against Kobane helped elucidate two things. One was whether Turkey’s collaboration with Deash is continuing or not. What emerged is that Turkey is continuing its relations with Deash and that Turkey will not solve the Kurdish problem in the north”[vi]. Bayik threatened to resume the PKK’s war with Turkey at the end of September.

This scenario provides a useful test for understanding the extent to which the AKP values the peace process with the PKK. There were two options: give the Kurds some room to maneuver in their struggle against ISIS in Kobane or jeopardize the peace process in Turkey. Erdogan responded by saying “It is wrong to view [ISIS and the PKK] differently, we need to deal with them jointly”[vii] and by launching airstrikes against Turkish Kurds who were, quite understandably, angry about the government’s policy in Kobane[viii].

The Turkish government’s response to the attack on Kobane is very difficult to explain if we take for granted its claim that ISIS is a primary national security threat: why would they choose to strangle the Kurdish resistance on their own border with Syria if that was so? The response is equally difficult to reconcile with the government’s purported desire to avoid threats to its security emanating from the PKK: relaxing their grip on Kobane and allowing the Kurds to defend themselves against ISIS was hardly an unreasonable demand, yet they chose to ignore it and risk another war with the PKK. The response makes much more sense when one begins to realise that the primary aim is to undermine and weaken the Kurds: this explains why the PKK’s demands were ignored and why the under-equipped Syrian Kurds were left to their own devices in Kobane. This theory carries greater explanatory power.

The Anti-Democratic Security Bill

A report published by Human Rights Watch on 11 December 2014 examined the Turkish government’s proposals to dramatically expand police powers under the usual guise of protecting national security[ix]. According to Human Rights Watch:

“Turkey has a track record of abusive policing, with serious human rights violations occurring regularly during police operations. These include violations of freedom of assembly, unjustified use of lethal force and other excessive use of force, and cases of torture and other prohibited ill-treatment of detainees… Against this background, the rapid expansion of vague or broad police powers, and the moves to sideline the supervisory role of prosecutors and judges in the exercise of those powers, is particularly alarming”.

Human Rights Watch was particularly concerned about the possible use of preventive detention, the ability to use lethal force with insufficient safeguards, and increased prison sentences for protestors who partially conceal their faces. The head of Turkey’s Bar Association argued “This legislation is the end of the separation of powers; the administration will have judicial powers”[x].

Quite understandably, the KCK – a Kurdish umbrella organisation including the PKK – claimed that the new security bill “threatens the Kurdish peace process” and demanded instead greater democracy in Turkey (as Erdogan promised in 2005)[xi]. The leader of the Kurdish Question focused HDP, Selahattin Demirtas, said of the security bill “We will break our back not to let it be adopted”[xii].

Once again, the Turkish government was faced with several choices: either stick to Erdogan’s earlier promise to democratise Turkey or risk another war with the PKK. Erdogan responded by upbraiding those who opposed the fundamentally anti-democratic bill: “Your duty is to make these laws in parliament, not to block them…One way or another, this code will pass”[xiii]. Recent events demonstrate that the HDP and the KCK were right to be alarmed – on 28th July 2015, a few days after re-starting the war with the PKK, Erdogan said “it [is] time to put into practice the legislation on security issues which was recently adopted by parliament”[xiv].

This is another example of the Turkish government prioritizing its own power and strength over the Kurdish peace process.

Öcalan’s Call for PKK Disarmament

Despite all of the above evidence strongly suggesting that the Turkish government was not taking the peace process seriously, on 28th February 2015 Abdullah Öcalan took a landmark step towards ending the PKK’s campaign. According to a statement read out by the HDP’s Süreyya Önder, which was a direct quote from Öcalan, “I invite the PKK to convene an extraordinary congress in spring months to make the strategic and historic decision on the basis of ending the armed struggle”[xv]. Önder called on “all democratic parties to support this democratic solution” and asserted that Turkey was “closer than ever to peace”[xvi].

Öcalan’s offer to end the armed struggle came with a list of ten principles that were to form the basis of future negotiations with the government. These principles came to be known as the Dolmabahçe Declaration:

1. The definition and content of democratic politics must be debated.
2. What needs to be done for the national and local dimensions of democratic settlement.
3. The legal and democratic assurances of free citizenship.
4. The relationship between democratic politics and the state and society and its institutionalization.
5. The socioeconomic dimensions of the settlement process.
6. The new security structure that the settlement process will lead to.
7. The solving of problems and the legal assurances pertaining to women’s rights, culture and ecology.
8. The concept, definition and development of pluralist, democratic and equal mechanisms to acknowledge identity.
9. The definition of concepts of democratic state, common land and the nation by democratic means, their legal and constitutional rights enshrined in the pluralist democratic system.
10. A new constitution aiming to internalize all of the above democratic moves and transformations.

In response, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told a meeting of the ruling AKP “The discourse of arms and violence will end and the road will be opened for a discourse of democracy”[xvii]. Erdogan expressed his hope that the parties would offer their support to make the plan work whilst insisting that Turkish security forces would never disarm as part of the resolution process[xviii].

Here was a seemingly genuine chance to give effect to Erdogan’s 2005 promise to deepen Turkish democracy in order to solve the dispute with the PKK. However, by 15th March Erdogan had completely changed his tone: “The only thing in their eyes is the Kurdish question. What are you talking about? There is no such thing, there is no Kurdish question… We never had a Kurdish problem in this country”[xix].

One plausible explanation for Erdogan’s rejectionist stance is his sudden realization that the HDP might have performed quite well in the upcoming parliamentary election, and consequently denied Erdogan a sufficiently large majority to transform Turkey’s constitution into a presidential system. Realising that his support base in the Kurdish southeast was crumbling, it is possible that Erdogan tacked to the right in order to soothe the feelings of Turkish nationalists.

By 17th July, Erdogan openly declared, “I do not recognise the phrase ‘Dolmabahçe Agreement’”[xx]. Cut it however you like, this is not an earnest approach to peace and security.

Conclusion

Space precludes a full examination of the events leading up to the return to war. News reports suggest that the PKK was repeatedly provoked in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. There were bomb blasts at HDP rallies, attacks on villagers in Roboski and an apparent uptick in arrests and intimidation. On top of all this, the HDP delegation responsible for liaising with Abdullah Öcalan in his prison cell on Imrali Island was suddenly denied access to the powerful leader. Throughout all of this, the ceasefire largely held.

Even if one omits reference to the these provocations (which, quite frankly, could fill a small book) it is quite clear that the present war with the PKK was never necessary. Genuine attempts to make peace and end the armed conflict were rebuffed. For the US State Department to claim “Turkey has continued to come under attack by PKK terrorists and we recognise their right to defend themselves” is a vile insult. How many people will die as a result of this stupid and selfish policy?

References:

[i] D.L. Phillips, The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East (2015, Transaction Publishers) at p. 131.

[ii] A. Öcalan, Prison Writings: The PKK and the Kurdish Question in the 21st Century (2011, Transmedia Publishing) at p. 59.

[iii] Hurriyet Daily News, YPG ‘provides safe corridor for Turkey’, hurriyetdailynews.com/ypg-provides-safe-corridor-for-turkey.aspx

[iv] New York Times, Turkish Inaction on ISIS Advance Dismays the U.S., nytimes.com/2014/10/08/world/middleeast/isis-syria-coalition-strikes.html

[v] The Guardian, Kobane: Anger Grows as Turkey Stops Kurds from Aiding Militias in Syria, theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/08/kobani-isis-turkey-kurds-ypg-syria-erdogan

[vi] al-Monitor, Exclusive: PKK Commander Threatens to Resume War,
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-pkk-commander-bayik-threatens-resume-war.html

[vii] Supra n. v

[viii] Reuters, U.S.-led Air Strikes Intensify as Syria Conflict Destabilises Turkey, uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/uk-mideast-crisis-idUKKCN0I30YW20141014

[ix] Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Security Bill Undermines Rights, hrw.org/news/2014/12/11/turkey-security-bill-undermines-rights

[x] Financial Times, Turkey’s new public order law prompts fist fights, ft.com/cms/s/0/9ac14c3e-bcee-11e4-9902-00144feab7de.html

[xi] Bas News, KCK: Turkish Government is Wasting Time, basnews.com/en/news/2015/02/16/kck-turkish-government-is-wasting-time/

[xii] Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish government pushes security bill amid opposition’s outcry, hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-pushes-security-bill-amid-oppositions-outcry.aspx

[xiii] Supra, n. x.

[xiv] Hurriyet Daily News, Continuation of peace process not possible amid attacks: Turkey’s Erdogan, hurriyetdailynews.com/continuation-of-peace-process-not-possible-amid-attacks-turkeys-erdogan.aspx

[xv] Todays Zaman, Öcalan calls on PKK to convene conference on laying down arms, todayszaman.com/national_ocalan-calls-on-pkk-to-convene-conference-on-laying-down-arms_373924.html

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] eKurd Daily, Turkish President Welcomes Öcalan’s Call for Disarmament of PKK, ekurd.net/turkeys-erdogan-welcomes-ocalans-call-for-disarmament-of-pkk-2015-03-01

[xix] Hurriyet Daily News, What more do Kurds want, Erdogan asks, hurriyetdailynews.com/what-more-do-kurds-want-erdogan-asks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79720&NewsCatID=338

[xx] Hurriyet Daily News, HDP has inorganic link to PKK: Erdogan, hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-has-inorganic-link-to-pkk-erdogan-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85555&NewsCatID=338

Read Part One of this article here

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